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I. STATEMENT CASE 
A. Introduction Background 
The Page Respondents I hereby incorporate by this reference the Statement of the Case 
and all factual and procedural history set forth in their Respondents' Brief in this matter, 
concurrently filed here\vith. In addition, the Page Respondents note the following additional 
background facts relevant to Cross-Appeal: 
Following the various Defendants' combined motions for summary judgment below, the 
District Court entered Judgment against Plaintiff Stilwyn Inc. ("Stilwyn") on the basis that: 
The Plaintiffs =·-·""~ are barred by res judicata, specifically claim 
preclusion, because the claims should have been brought in the 
Federal Case Stilwyn voluntarily subjected itself to the 
jurisdictional powers of the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Idaho as an intervener, could have asserted the counterclaim, and 
did attempt to join the counterclaim with the FDIC. 
(R. Vol. 5, p. 1095.) found that Stil-wyn could and should have litigated all of its 
claims in the underlying federal case: 
After Stilwyn cannot simply pick and choose where 
and when to file its claims. It chose to join the Federal Case, it 
assumed it had the ability to assert the claim, it saw there was 
opposition and apparently tried to maneuver past the opposition. 
The claim had to be raised there and then. 
(R. Vol. 5, p. 1099.) 
1 For purposes of this brief, "Page Respondents" shall refer to Michael Page, Michael Edward 
Page Trust, Michael Page 2008 Revocable Trust, John Sofro, Bryan Furlong, Wali Investments, 
LLC, David Wali, Anaconda Investments, LLC, Anaconda Managers, LLC, Portfolio PB-Idaho, 
LLC, Rokan Property Services, LLC, Rokan Financial Services, LLC, and Robert A. Kantor. 
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Based on the District Court's analysis of Stihvyn's claims, including the fact that Stihvyn 
should have known that its claims may be barred by res judicata, and in view of relevant Idaho 
case law regarding the propriety of attorney fee awards under Idaho Code §§ 12-121 and 123 in 
cases deemed barred by the doctrine of res judicata, the Page Respondents argued that they were 
entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees for their defense of this frivolous action. (See R. 
Vol. 5, p. 1183.) 
On consideration of the Page Respondents' request for an award of attorney fees, the 
District Court acknowledged (and Stilwyn did not dispute) that the Page Respondents were 
among the various 'prevailing parties' for purposes of the attorney fee discussion. (R. Vol. 5, p. 
1300.) The District Court found unequivocally that Stihvyn's claims were barred by res 
judicata, that Stilvvyn "should have raised claims" in the underlying federal action that precedes 
this litigation, that Stihvyn "arguably did" at least raise those claims in the underlying federal 
action, and that StilVvyn "chose to join the fray in the Federal Case and must live with the 
consequences." (See generally, R. Vol. 5, p. 1099.) Nonetheless, under the cloak of discretion, 
the District Court denied the Page Defendants' request on the basis that, despite having 
determined that Stilwyn and its counsel knew that they had previously raised the exact same 
claims in a separate action, Stilwyn had presented "fairly debatable" arguments as to the 
application of resjudicata. (R. Vol. 5, p. 1300.) The Page Respondents hereby appeal. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court err in denying the Page Respondents' request for attorney fees 
on the basis that the Plaintiff knew or should have known its action would be barred 
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by doctrine of res judicata, and determining 
brought frivolously, unreasonably, and/or 
an action that was barred by res judicata? 
2. Are the Page Respondents entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIE\V 
action was not 
The decision to award attorney fees is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial 
court. Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580,592,917 P.2d 737, 749 (1996). However, 
in the exercise of that discretion, the Court must act consistently with the legal standards set forth 
in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54. Kelly v. Hodges, 119 Idaho 872, 811 P.2d 48 (Ct. App. 
1991 ). Pursuant to that Rule, "the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at the 
discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as defined in 
Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by any statute or contract." I.R.C.P. 54(e). 
The Page Respondents assert that they ought to have been awarded attorney fees in the 
proceedings below pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-121 and 123. "Trial courts may award attorney 
fees under LC.§ 12-121 if the case was 'brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably 
or without foundation."' Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 487, 65 P.3d 502, 509 (2003) 
(quoting I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). Similarly: 
LC. § 12-123 allows for such an award to a party adversely affected by 
frivolous conduct, which is defined as conduct that "obviously serves 
merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the civil action" or 
"is not supported in fact or warranted under existing law and cannot be 
supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law." 
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Berkshire Investments, LLC v. , 153 7" ,J, 278 P.3d 943, 956 (2012) (quoting LC. 
§ 1 23). 
The test to determine whether 
this Court: 
trial court abused its discretion has been well-settled by 
Vv'ben a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the 
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether 
the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the lower court acted \vithin the boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
before it; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason. 
Sunnyside Indus. & Prof! Park, LLC v. E. Idaho Pub. Health Dist., 147 Idaho 668, 674, 214 
P.3d 654, 660 (Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis (citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho 
Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)). 
The Page Respondents u~'"'"" that an award of costs and fees their favor should have 
been granted, pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-121 andior l 23, on the basis that this action was 
brought and pursued frivolously, that Stilwyn had previously and voluntarily abandoned its 
opportunity to litigate the issues presented in this case during the underlying federal action, and 
was thus barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The District Court abused its discretion when it 
denied the Page Respondents their requested fees, in view of the weight of relevant legal 
authority that deems actions barred by res judicata frivolous as a matter of course. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Page Respondents were Prevailing Parties. 
In the proceedings below, following the entry of Summary Judgment in favor of these 
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collective Respondents, the District Court by its Memorandum Decision found that all of the 
Respondents were prevailing parties for purposes of evaluating costs and fees under Rule 54. (R. 
Vol. 5, p. 1300.) Similarly, "[t]he Plaintiff [did] not dispute that the Defendants [were] the 
prevailing party." (Id.) Thus, the only question is ,vhether the District Court erred in determining 
that Stihvyn's bat-red claims did not give rise to a finding of frivolous or unreasonable claims 
and/or conduct for purposes of attorneys fees under Idaho Code§§ 12-121 and/or 12-123. 
B. Page Respondents \Vere Entitled to Recover their Attorney Fees in the District 
Court Pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-121 and/or 12-123. 
According to Idaho Code § 12-121, "[i]n any civil action, the judge may award 
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties." Rule 54( e )( 1) limits the instances 
in which attorney's fees may be awarded pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121: "attorney fees under 
section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts 
presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation .... " I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). Similarly, Idaho Code§ 12-123 permits an award of 
attorney fees "to any party to [an] action adversely affected by frivolous conduct," defined as 
"conduct of a party to a civil action or of his counsel of record that ... is not supported in fact or 
warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law." LC. § 12-123. Under these standards, because Plaintiff 
brought and pursued an action that it and its counsel knew or should have kno\\'11 was barred by 
the doctrine of res judicata in view of its prior attempts to litigate the same issue(s) in federal 
court, an award of attorney fees should have been granted to the Page Respondents for defending 
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against this action. 
Under these standards, the District Court abused its discretion when it did not follow the 
legal standard set forth in the uniform case law available, as presented by the Page Respondents 
and not countered by Stilwyn, which sets forth that a res judicata barred claim necessarily gives 
rise to an award of attorney fees tmder the standards governing frivolity in litigation. Ample case 
law in the state ofidaho supports an award of attorney fees under ldaho Code§§ 12-121 and/or 
12-123 in situations in which the claims asserted are barred by res judicata. Where a lawsuit is 
brought as "simply an attempt to re-litigate an issue that had already been decided," this Court 
has held that such an action "lacked reasonable basis in fact or law," and a district court's award 
of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-123 is proper on that basis. See Berkshire 
Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 278 P.3d 943 (2012). Similarly, where a party has 
been found, as here, to "voluntarily dismiss" its claims against a defendant, any later attempt to 
revive the same claims in a different forum constitutes a "frivolous" claim sufficient to justify an 
award of attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121. See Davidson v. Davidson, 150 Idaho 455, 
248 P.3d 242 (2011). It has therefore long been held as a rule in Idaho that litigation over claims 
barred by res judicata is frivolous, justifying an award of attorney fees, and the District Court 
abused its discretion when it failed to apply those legal standards. 
In the seminal case on this issue, Cole v. Kunzler, 115 Idaho 552, 768 P.2d 815 (Ct. App. 
1989), the ldaho Court of Appeals summarized the problem similar to how the District Court 
should have decided the issues presented here: "The court decided that after Cole and Taylor had 
lost on their lien claim in Cassia County, the appropriate remedy would have been to perfect an 
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appeal in that proceeding; and that subjecting the Kunzlers to further litigation in another county 
on the same issue was unreasonable." 115 Idaho at 558. The District Court similarly determined 
that the proper remedy for Stih:vyn, if dissatisfied with the entry of final dismissal in the federal 
case, would have been to object to and/or appeal that determination. (R. Vol. 5, p. 1100-1101.) 
Following Cole, then, "subjecting the [Page Respondents] to further litigation in another [forum] 
on the same issue was unreasonable." The Idaho Court of Appeals determined that such an 
unreasonable litigation, specifically barred by res judicata, was "frivolous," noting that it had 
"no hesitancy in stating that the trial court's decision [was] fully supported by the record" and 
that an award of attorney fees under Rule 54(e)(l) was therefore appropriate. 115 Idaho at 558. 
See also Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 65 P.3d 502 (2003) (Idaho Supreme Court following 
Cole and upholding an award of attorney fees under Rule 54(e)(l) where the claims asserted 
were barred by res judicata and therefore were "frivolous" as set forth in Idaho Code § 12-121 ); 
Kahre-Richardes Family Foundation, Inc. v. Viilage of Baldwinsville, New York, 953 F.Supp. 39 
(N.D. New York 1997) (awarding attorney fees where claims were barred by res judicata); 
Swface v. Commerce Bank of Hutchison, 1990 WL 129218, *4 (D. Kansas 1990) ("The 
imposition of fees and sanctions in a case obviously bmTed by the doctrine of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel is clearly appropriate.") (citing Uithoven v. US. Army Corps of Engineers, 
884 F.2d 844, 847 (5th Cir.I 989); Damino v. Barrell, 702 F.Supp. 954, 957 (E.D.N.Y.1988), 
aff'd vvithout pub. opinion, 875 F.2d 307 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 69 (1989); Lind-
Waldock & Co. v. Caan, 121 F.R.D. 337, 342 (N.D.Ill 1988); Lee v. Criterion Insurance Co., 
659 F.Supp. 813, 820-22 (S.D.Ga.1987); Columbus v. United Pacific Insurance Co., 641 
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F.Supp. 707, 711-12 (S.D.Miss.1986), aff'd without pub. opinion, 833 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir.1987); 
Lewis v. East Feliciana Parish School Board, 635 F.Supp. 296, 302 (M.D.La.1986), ajf'd, 820 
F.2d 143 (5th Cir.1987)). 
The District Court improperly denied attorney fees to the Page Respondents on the basis 
that it was "fairly debatable" whether the Plaintiffs claims were barred by res judicata. (R. Vol. 
5, p. 1300.) A cursory review of applicable Idaho case law, however, demonstrates a common 
premise: if the res judicata defense is clearly applicable, as here, attorney fees are appropriately 
awarded under Idaho Code §§ 12-121 and/or 12-123, supra. There is no case law available 
(none cited by either Stilwyn or the District Court) to suggest that a "fairly debatable" test is 
applicable to the determination of attorney fees in a case baITed by operation of res judicata; the 
attorney fee analysis remains uniform and intact where a plaintiffs claims are barred by res 
judicata but the plaintiff improperly and unreasonably pursues them, nonetheless. In Berkshire 
Investments, LLC, the court dismissed the plaintiff's entire action on summary judgment (1) 
because the plaintiff "attempted to re-litigate an issue that had already been decided," and (2) 
because the plaintiffs suit "was based on identical facts" as in the underlying action. Berkshire 
Investments, LLC, 153 Idaho at 86, 278 P.3d at 956. The court found that attorney fees were 
waITanted under Idaho Code§ 12-123 because the plaintiffs claims "lacked reasonable basis in 
fact or law." Id There was no discussion as to whether the plaintiff in Berkshire had made any 
sort of good faith mistake based upon fairly debatable interpretations of the issues it had 
attempted to "re-litigate." The District Court here therefore abused its discretion in applying a 
test and a legal standard for which there is no legal precedent to do so. 
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In Davidson, this Court held that the plaintiffs attempt to re-raise claims on appeal that 
were voluntarily dismissed against a defendant at the trial level was frivolous, and, therefore, 
attorney fees were awardable under Idaho Code§ 12-121. Davidson, 150 Idaho at 255,248 P.Jd 
at 468. Again, the decision is devoid of any discussion about a "fairly debatable" analysis of the 
plaintiffs claims that, by its involvement in the earlier litigation, it knew or should have known 
would be barred by operation of res judicata. The Court of Appeals in Cole similarly affirmed 
the trial court's findings (1) that the plaintiffs should have appealed their lien claim rather than 
subjecting the defenda.11ts to "further litigation in another county on the same issue," which was 
"unreasonable"; and, (2) that "'once the res judicata defense became so blatantly apparent,' 
further litigation became frivolous." Cole, 115 Idaho at 558, 768 P.2d at 821 (emphasis added). 
Based upon the clear application of the res judicata defense, the Cole court held that there was 
no abuse of discretion in awarding attorney fees pursuant to Rule 54(e)(l) and Idaho Code§ 12-
121. Id. Finally, in Burns, this Court determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
awarding attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 because the plaintiff "clearly knew ... that 
the issues he raised would be barred by ... res judicata." Burns, 138 Idaho 480, 65 P.3d 502 
(citing Cole, 115 Idaho at 558, 768 P.2d at 821). The same analysis applies here, and there was 
no cognizable legal justification for the District Court to apply a legal standard for which there is 
no basis on this issue. 
Plainly stated, the forgoing case law stands for the propositions that Idaho courts do not 
perform a "fairly debatable" analysis when the res judicata defense has been found to be 
applicable on summary judgment, and Idaho courts do not examine each and every fact of a res 
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judicata case to determine whether attorney fees are warranted. Rather, if a trial court finds that 
the res judicata defense is clearly applicable, then attorney fees are awarded as a matter of 
course. Here, the District Court held that the Plaintiff's claims were barred by res fudicata 
because (1) "[the Plaintifil chose to join the Federal Case, [(2) the Plaintiff] assumed it had the 
ability to assert the claim, [and, (3) the Plaintiff] saw there was opposition and tried to maneuver 
past the opposition. The claim had to be raised there and then." (R. Vol. 5, p. 1099.) Based on 
the District Court's observations regarding the Plaintiff's conduct, it is abundantly clear that the 
Plaintiff knew or should have known that its claims would be barred by res judicata. 
Accordingly, the Page Respondents should have been awarded the attorney fees they incurred for 
being forced to hire counsel to defend this frivolous litigation, and the District Court abused its 
discretion by failing to apply that legal standard. 
C. The Page Respondents are Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
"Attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to LC.§ 12-121 on appeal if this Court is left 
with an abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
umeasonably or without foundation." Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 487, 65 P.3d 502, 509 
(2003) (citing .Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918, 591 P.2d 1078, 1085 
(1979)). For the same reasons as articulated above, with respect to the Page Respondents' 
entitlement to an award of attorney fees below, the Page Respondents respectfully request an 
award of attorney fees from this Court for Stihvyn's frivolous appeal of this action, and 
specifically based upon the frivolity of Stilwyn's objection and opposition to the Page 
Respondents' entitlement to attorney fees under the clear and well-settled case law cited herein. 
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V. 
Based on foregoing, the Page Respondents respectfully request this Court reverse 
the District Court's denial of attorneys fees, and "t','L"'.:..2 "',,"- this case back to the 
determine the amount of attorney fees justly due. 
/?Q"'r .... 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~ day of August, 2014. 
Court to 
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A. 
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By tG:-@rl= 
Richard H. Greener 
.,~ ... ~~ J. Lloyd III 
Attorneys for Respondents/Cross-Appellants 
I .. ....,.._,.......,'-J CERTIFY that on the ,zgr--day of August, 2014, two (2) true and correct 
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ff Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Delivery 
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